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Are financial systems simply casinos where the rich come to place their bets, or do the 
services provided by the financial system affect the rate of long-run economic growth?  
Economists disagree about the impact of finance on growth.  Many development economists do 
not even consider finance worth discussing.  A collection of essays by the “pioneers of 
development economics” – including three winners of the Nobel Prize in Economics – does not 
discuss finance (Meier and Seers, 1984) and leading textbooks on economic growth also ignore 
the financial sector (Jones, 2001 and Weil, 2004).  At the other extreme, Nobel Laureate Merton 
Miller (1998, p. 14) holds that “... that financial markets contribute to economic growth is a 
proposition almost too obvious for serious discussion.”  As a third view, Nobel Laureate Robert 
Lucas (1988) holds that the role of finance in economic growth has been “over-stressed” by the 
growth literature.  Resolving this debate will affect the intensity with which researchers and 
policymakers attempt to identify and adopt appropriate financial sector policies. 
In this paper, we first review the literature on the relation between finance and growth.  
Theory provides ambiguous predictions concerning the question of whether financial 
development exerts a positive, causative impact on long-run economic growth.  Theoretical 
models show that financial instruments, markets, and institutions may arise to mitigate the 
effects of information and transaction costs.  In emerging to ameliorate market frictions, 
financial arrangements change the incentives and constraints facing economic agents.  Thus, 
financial systems may influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation, 
and hence long-run growth rates. Even putting aside causal issues, a host of theoretical models 
illustrate the reductions in financial market frictions that increase expected rates of return and 
improve risk diversification opportunities could increase or decrease growth rates depending on   2
the general equilibrium effects on aggregate saving rates.  Furthermore, a comparatively less 
well-developed theoretical literature examines the dynamic interactions between finance and 
growth by developing models where the financial system influences growth, and growth 
transforms the operation of the financial system.  Thus, financial development might primarily 
reflect changes in long-run growth opportunities whose mainsprings derive from other sources.  
While theory provides a complex array of conflicting conjectures, the empirical evidence is less 
ambiguous. 
A growing body of empirical research produces a remarkably consistent narrative: The 
services provided by the financial system exert a first-order impact on long-run economic 
growth.  Building on work by Bagehot (1873), Schumpeter (1912), Gurley and Shaw (1955), 
Goldsmith (1969), and McKinnon (1973), recent research has employed different econometric 
methodologies and data sets in producing three core results.  First, countries with better-
developed financial systems tend to grow faster.  Specifically, countries with (i) large, privately-
owned banks that funnel credit to private enterprises and (ii) liquid stock exchanges tend to grow 
faster than countries with corresponding lower levels of financial development.  The level of 
banking development and stock market liquidity each exerts an independent, positive influence 
on economic growth.  Second, simultaneity bias does not seem to be the cause of this result.  
Third, better-functioning financial systems ease the external financing constraints that impede 
firm and industrial expansion.  Thus, one channel through which financial development matters 
for growth is by easing the ability of financially constrained firms to access external capital and 
expand.   
Each examination of the finance-growth nexus has distinct methodological shortcomings, 
which advertises the value of using different approaches with different strengths and weaknesses   3
in drawing the most accurate inferences possible about the impact of finance on growth.  In this 
paper, we focus on four classes of empirical studies: (1) pure cross-country growth regressions, 
(2) panel techniques that exploit both the cross-country and time-series dimensions of the data, 
(3) microeconomic based studies that examine the mechanisms through which finance may 
influence economic growth, and (4) individual country cases.  They all suggest a strong, positive 
relationship between the level of financial development and economic growth.  One common 
problem, however, plagues virtually all studies of finance and growth.  Theory suggests that 
financial contracts, markets, and intermediaries arise to reduce information and transaction costs 
and therefore provide financial services to the economy that facilitate the screening of firms 
before they are financed, the monitoring of firms after they are finance, the managing of risk, 
both idiosyncratic project risk and liquidity risk, and the exchange of goods, services, and 
financial claims.  But, researchers do not have very good cross-country measures of the ability of 
the financial system to provide these services to the economy.  Designing empirical proxies of 
“financial development” that correspond more closely to our concepts of financial development 
represents a valuable area for future research.   
Without ignoring the weaknesses of existing work and the need for future research, the 
consistency of existing empirical results motivates vigorous inquiry into the policy determinants 
of financial development as a mechanism for promoting growth in countries around the world.  If 
financial development is crucial for growth, how can countries develop well-functioning 
financial systems?  What legal, regulatory, and policy changes would foster the emergence of 
growth-enhancing financial markets and intermediaries?   
The second part of this paper reviews the literature on the historical and policy 
determinants of financial development. Governments play a central role in shaping the operation   4
of financial systems and the degree to which large segments of the financial system have access 
to financial services.  We discuss the relationship between financial sector policies and economic 
development. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Sections 1 and 2 review the theory and 
empirical evidence on the relation between finance and growth.  Section 3 turns to an 
examination of financial sector policies, and Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Finance and Growth: Theory 
1.1. What is financial development? 
The costs of acquiring information, enforcing contracts, and making transactions create 
incentives for the emergence of particular types of financial contracts, markets and 
intermediaries.  Different types and combinations of information, enforcement, and transaction 
costs in conjunction with different legal, regulatory, and tax systems have motivated distinct 
financial contracts, markets, and intermediaries across countries and throughout history.   
In arising to ameliorate market frictions, financial systems naturally influence the 
allocation of resources across space and time.  For instance, the emergence of banks that improve 
the acquisition of information about firms and managers will undoubtedly alter the allocation of 
credit.  Similarly, financial contracts that make investors more confident that firms will pay them 
back will likely influence how people allocate their savings.  This section describes models in 
which market frictions motivate the emergence of financial contracts, markets, and 
intermediaries that in turn alter incentives in ways that influence economic growth. 
We focus on five broad functions provided by the financial system to ease market 
frictions:   5
•  Produce information ex ante about possible investments and allocate capital  
•  Monitor investments and exert corporate governance after providing finance 
•  Facilitate the trading, diversification, and management of risk 
•  Mobilize and pool savings 
•  Ease the exchange of goods and services 
While all financial systems provide these financial functions, there are large differences in how 
well financial systems provide these functions. 
Financial development occurs when financial instruments, markets, and intermediaries 
ameliorate – though do not necessarily eliminate – the effects of information, enforcement, and 
transactions costs and therefore do a correspondingly better job at providing the five financial 
functions.  Thus, financial development involves improvements in the (i) production of ex ante 
information about possible investments, (ii) monitoring of investments and implementation of 
corporate governance, (iii) trading, diversification, and management of risk, (iv) mobilization 
and pooling of savings, and (v) exchange of goods and services.  Since many market frictions 
exist and since laws, regulations, and policies differ markedly across economies and over time, 
improvements along any single dimension may have different implications for resource 
allocation and welfare depending on the other frictions at play in the economy. 
1.2. Producing information and allocating capital 
There are large costs associated with evaluating firms, managers, and market conditions 
before making investment decisions.  Individual savers may not have the ability to collect, 
process, and produce information on possible investments.  Since savers will be reluctant to 
invest in activities about which there is little reliable information, high information costs may 
keep capital from flowing to its highest value use.  Thus, while many models assume that capital 
flows toward the most profitable firms, this presupposes that investors have good information 
about firms, managers, and market conditions.    6
Financial intermediaries may reduce the costs of acquiring and processing information 
and thereby improve resource allocation (Boyd and Prescott, 1986).  Without intermediaries, 
each investor would face the large fixed cost associated with evaluating firms, managers, and 
economic conditions. Consequently, groups of individuals may form financial intermediaries that 
undertake the costly process of researching investment possibilities for others.   
By improving information on firms, managers, and economic conditions, financial 
intermediaries can accelerate economic growth.  Assuming that many entrepreneurs 
solicit capital and that capital is scarce, financial intermediaries that produce better 
information on firms will thereby fund more promising firms and induce a more efficient 
allocation of capital (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990).  Besides identifying the best 
production technologies, financial intermediaries may also boost the rate of technological 
innovation by identifying those entrepreneurs with the best chances of successfully 
initiating new goods and production processes (King and Levine, 1993b; Galetovic, 
1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998; and Morales, 2003).  
 
Stock markets may also stimulate the production of information about firms.  As markets 
become larger and more liquid, agents may have greater incentives to expend resources in 
researching firms because it is easier to profit from this information by trading in big and liquid 
markets (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) and more liquid (Kyle, 1984; and Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1993).  Intuitively, with larger and more liquid markets, it is easier for an agent who has acquired 
information to disguise this private information and make money by trading in the market.  Thus, 
larger more liquid markets will boost incentives to produce this valuable information with 
positive implications for capital allocation (Merton, 1987).     7
Finally, capital market imperfections can also influence growth by impeding investment 
in human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993).  In the presence of indivisibilities in human capital 
investment and imperfect capital markets, the initial distribution of wealth will influence who 
can gains the resources to undertake human capital augmenting investments.  This implies a 
suboptimal allocation of resources with potential implications on aggregate output both in the 
short and the long run. 
1.3. Monitoring firms and exerting corporate governance 
  Corporate governance is central to understanding economic growth in general and the 
role of financial factors in particular.  The degree to which the providers of capital to a firm can 
effectively monitor and influence how firms use that capital has ramifications on both savings 
and allocation decisions.  To the extent that shareholders and creditors effectively monitor firms 
and induce managers to maximize firm value, this will improve the efficiency with which firms 
allocate resources and make savers more willing to finance production and innovation.  In turn, 
the absence of financial arrangements that enhance corporate governance may impede the 
mobilization of savings from disparate agents and also keep capital from flowing to profitable 
investments.   
  An assortment of market frictions may keep diffuse shareholders from effectively 
exerting corporate governance, which allows managers to pursue projects that benefit themselves 
rather than the firm and society at large.  In particular, large information asymmetries typically 
exist between managers and small shareholders and managers have enormous discretion over the 
flow of information.  Furthermore, small shareholders frequently lack the expertise and 
incentives to monitor managers because of the large costs and complexity associated with 
overseeing mangers and exerting corporate control.  This may induce a “free-rider” problem   8
because each stockowner’s stake is so small: Each investor relies on others to undertake the 
costly process of monitoring managers, so there is too little monitoring.  The resultant gap in 
information between corporate insiders and diffuse shareholders implies that the voting rights 
mechanism will not work effectively.  Also, the board of directors may not represent the interests 
of minority shareholders.  Management frequently “captures” the board and manipulates 
directors into acting in the best interests of the managers, not the shareholders.  Finally, in many 
countries legal codes do not adequately protect the rights of small shareholders and legal systems 
frequently do not enforce the legal codes that actually are on the books concerning diffuse 
shareholder rights.  Thus, large information and contracting costs may keep diffuse shareholders 
from effectively exerting corporate governance, with adverse effects on resource allocation and 
economic growth. 
One response to the frictions that prevent dispersed shareholders from effectively 
governing firms is for firms to have a large, concentrated owner, but this ownership structure has 
its own problems as reviewed by Levine and Laeven (2008).  Large owners have greater 
incentives to acquire information and monitor managers and greater power to thwart managerial 
discretion (Grossman and Hart, 1980).  The existence of large shareholders, however, creates a 
different agency problem: Conflicts arise between the controlling shareholder and other 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  The controlling owner may expropriate resources 
from the firm, or provide jobs, perquisites, and generous business deals to related parties in a 
manner that hurts the firm and society, but benefits the controlling owner.  Indeed, controlling 
owners are frequently powerful families that use pyramidal structures, cross-holdings, and super 
voting rights to magnify their control over many corporations and banks (La Porta et al., 1999; 
Caprio et al., 2007).  To the extent that diffuse or concentrated shareholders do not ameliorate   9
the corporate governance problem, theory suggests that other types of financial arrangements 
may arise to ease market frictions and improve the governance of corporations.    
In terms of intermediaries, a number of models show that well-functioning financial 
intermediaries influence growth by boosting corporate governance.  Bencivenga and Smith 
(1993) show that financial intermediaries that improve corporate governance by economizing on 
monitoring costs will reduce credit rationing and thereby boost productivity, capital 
accumulation, and growth.  Sussman (1993) and Harrison, Sussman, and Zeira (1999) develop 
models where financial intermediaries facilitate the flow of resources from savers to investors in 
the presence of informational asymmetries with positive growth effects.  Focusing on innovative 
activity, De La Fuente and Marin (1996) develop a model in which intermediaries arise to 
undertake the particularly costly process of monitoring innovative activities.  This improves 
credit allocation among competing technology producers with positive ramifications on 
economic growth. 
 
1.4. Risk amelioration 
  With information and transactions costs, financial contracts, markets and intermediaries 
may arise to ease the trading, hedging, and pooling of risk with implications for resource 
allocation and growth.  We divide the discussion into three categories: cross-sectional risk 
diversification, intertemporal risk sharing, and liquidity risk. 
Traditional finance theory focuses on cross-sectional diversification of risk.  Financial 
systems may mitigate the risks associated with individual projects, firms, industries, regions, 
countries, etc.  Banks, mutual funds, and securities markets all provide vehicles for trading, 
pooling, and diversifying risk.  The financial system’s ability to provide risk diversification 
services can affect long-run economic growth by altering resource allocation and savings rates.   10
The basic intuition is straightforward.  While savers generally do not like risk, high-return 
projects tend to be riskier than low-return projects.  Thus, financial markets that make it easier 
for people to diversify risk tend to induce a portfolio shift toward projects with higher expected 
returns (Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Patrick, 1966; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990).  
In terms of technological change, King and Levine (1993b) show that cross-sectional risk 
diversification can stimulate innovative activity.  Agents are continuously trying to make 
technological advances to gain a profitable market niche. Engaging in innovation is risky, 
however.  The ability to hold a diversified portfolio of innovative projects reduces risk and 
promotes investment in growth-enhancing innovative activities (with sufficiently risk averse 
agents). Thus, financial systems that ease risk diversification can accelerate technological change 
and economic growth. 
A third type of risk is liquidity risk.  Liquidity reflects the cost and speed with which 
agents can convert financial instruments into purchasing power at agreed prices.  Liquidity risk 
arises due to the uncertainties associated with converting assets into a medium of exchange.  
Informational asymmetries and transaction costs may inhibit liquidity and intensify liquidity risk.  
These frictions create incentives for the emergence of financial markets and institutions that 
augment liquidity.   
The standard link between liquidity and economic development arises because some 
high-return projects require a long-run commitment of capital, but savers do not like to 
relinquish control of their savings for long-periods.  Thus, if the financial system does not 
augment the liquidity of long-term investments, less investment is likely to occur in the high-
return projects.  Indeed, Hicks (1969, p. 143-145) argues that the products manufactured during 
the first decades of the Industrial Revolution had been invented much earlier.  Rather, the critical   11
innovation that ignited growth in 18th century England was capital market liquidity.  With liquid 
capital markets, savers can hold liquid assets -- like equity, bonds, or demand deposits -- that 
they can quickly and easily sell if they seek access to their savings.  Simultaneously, capital 
markets transform these liquid financial instruments into long-term capital investments.  Thus, 
the industrial revolution required a financial revolution so that large commitments of capital 
could be made for long periods (Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr, 1995). 
Levine (1991) shows that the endogenous formation of equity markets to provide 
liquidity can affect economic growth.  Specifically, savers receiving shocks that increase their 
need for liquidity can sell their equity claims to the future profits of the illiquid production 
technology to others.  Market participants do not verify whether other agents received shocks or 
not.  Participants simply trade in impersonal stock exchanges.  Thus, with liquid stock markets, 
equity holders can readily sell their shares, while firms have permanent access to the capital 
invested by the initial shareholders.  By facilitating trade, stock markets reduce liquidity risk. As 
stock market transaction costs fall, more investment occurs in the illiquid, high-return project.  If 
illiquid projects enjoy sufficiently large externalities, then greater stock market liquidity induces 
faster steady-state growth. 
Financial intermediaries may also enhance liquidity, reduce liquidity risk and influence 
economic growth.  Banks can offer liquid deposits to savers and undertake a mixture of liquid, 
low-return investments to satisfy demands on deposits and illiquid, high-return investments.  By 
providing demand deposits and choosing an appropriate mixture of liquid and illiquid 
investments, banks provide complete insurance to savers against liquidity risk while 
simultaneously facilitating long-run investments in high return projects.  Banks replicate the 
equilibrium allocation of capital that exists with observable shocks. Turning back to growth,   12
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) show that, by eliminating liquidity risk, banks can increase 
investment in the high-return, illiquid asset and therefore accelerate growth. 
Financial systems can also promote the accumulation of human capital (Jacoby, 1994).  
In particular, financial arrangements may facilitate borrowing for the accumulation of skills.  If 
human capital accumulation is not subject to diminishing returns on a social level, financial 
arrangements that ease human capital creation help accelerate economic growth (Galor and 
Zeira, 1993). 
1.5. Pooling of savings 
Mobilization -- pooling -- is the costly process of agglomerating capital from disparate 
savers for investment.  Mobilizing savings involves (a) overcoming the transaction costs 
associated with collecting savings from different individuals and (b) overcoming the 
informational asymmetries associated with making savers feel comfortable in relinquishing 
control of their savings.  Indeed, much of Carosso’s (1970) history of Investment Banking in 
America is a description of the diverse costs associated with raising capital in the United States 
during the 19th and 20th centuries. 
To economize on the costs associated with multiple bilateral contracts, pooling may also 
occur through intermediaries, where thousands of investors entrust their wealth to intermediaries 
that invest in hundreds of firms (Sirri and Tufano 1995, p. 83).  For this to occur, "mobilizers" 
have to convince savers of the soundness of the investments (Boyd and Smith, 1992).  Toward 
this end, intermediaries worry about establishing stellar reputations, so that savers feel 
comfortable about entrusting their savings to the intermediary (Lamoreaux, 1995). 
Financial systems that are more effective at pooling the savings of individuals can 
profoundly affect economic development by increasing savings, exploiting economies of scale,   13
and overcoming investment indivisibilities.  Besides the direct effect of better savings 
mobilization on capital accumulation, better savings mobilization can improve resource 
allocation and boost technological innovation.  Without access to multiple investors, many 
production processes would be constrained to economically inefficient scales (Sirri and Tufano, 
1995).  Furthermore, many endeavors require an enormous injection of capital that is beyond the 
means or inclination of any single investor.  (Bagehot 1873, p. 3-4) argued that a major 
difference between England and poorer countries was that in England the financial system could 
mobilize resources for “immense works.”  Thus, good projects would not fail for lack of capital.  
Bagehot was very explicit in noting that it was not the national savings rate per se, it was the 
ability to pool society’s resources and allocate those savings toward the most productive ends.  
Furthermore, mobilization frequently involves the creation of small denomination instruments.  
These instruments provide opportunities for households to hold diversified portfolios (Sirri and 
Tufano, 1995).   
 
1.6. Easing exchange 
  Financial arrangements that lower transaction costs can promote specialization, 
technological innovation and growth.  The links between facilitating transactions, specialization, 
innovation, and economic growth were core elements of Adam Smith’s (1776) Wealth of 
Nations. He argued that division of labor -- specialization -- is the principal factor underlying 
productivity improvements.  With greater specialization, workers are more likely to invent better 
machines or production processes (Smith, 1776, p. 3). 
Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any 
object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single 
object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety of things.   
   14
Smith (1776) focused on the role of money in lowering transaction costs, permitting 
greater specialization, and fostering technological innovation.  Information costs, however, may 
also motivate the emergence of money.  Since it is costly to evaluate the attributes of goods, 
barter exchange is very costly.  Thus, an easily recognizable medium of exchange may arise to 
facilitate exchange (King and Plosser, 1986; and Williamson and Wright, 1994).  The drop in 
transaction and information costs is not necessarily a one-time fall when economies move to 
money, however.  Transaction and information costs may continue to fall through financial 
innovation. 
Greenwood and Smith (1996) have modeled the connections between exchange, 
specialization, and innovation.  More specialization requires more transactions.  Since each 
transaction is costly, financial arrangements that lower transaction costs will facilitate greater 
specialization.  In this way, markets that promote exchange encourage productivity gains.  There 
may also be feedback from these productivity gains to financial market development.  If there are 
fixed costs associated with establishing markets, then higher income per capita implies that these 
fixed costs are less burdensome as a share of per capita income.  Thus, economic development 
can spur the development of financial markets. 
 
2. Finance and Growth: Evidence 
  2.1. Cross-country studies: Financial intermediaries 
We first examine the application of broad cross-country growth regressions to the study 
of finance and growth.  These studies aggregate economic growth over long periods, a decade or 
more, and assess the relationship between long-run growth and measures of financial 
development.  King and Levine (1993a,b,c) build on earlier cross-country work by Goldsmith 
(1969).  In particular, King and Levine (1993a,b,c) more than double Goldsmith’s (1969) sample   15
of countries, study growth over a 30-year horizon, and systematically control for many possible 
determinants of economic growth such as initial income, educational attainment, inflation, black 
market exchange rate premia, government spending, openness to trade, and political instability.  
Furthermore, they examine whether financial development is associated with productivity 
growth and capital accumulation, which are two channels through which finance may influence 
economic growth. 
King and Levine (1993b, henceforth KL) study 77 countries over the period 1960-1989.  
To measure financial development, KL focus on DEPTH, which equals the size of the financial 
intermediary sector.  It equals the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus demand 
and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP.  
An important weakness with this measure of financial development is that DEPTH measures the 
size of the financial intermediary sector.  It may not, however, represent an accurate proxy for 
the functioning of the financial system.  It may not proxy for how well bank research firms, exert 
corporate control, or provide risk management services to clients.  KL experiment with 
alternative measures of financial development that are designed to gauge who is conducting 
credit allocation, i.e., whether it is banks or the government, and to where the credit is flowing, 
i.e., to the private sector or to the government and state-owned enterprises produce.  They obtain 
similar results with these alternative indicators of financial development. (Also, see La Porta et 
al. 2001.)   
KL assess the strength of the empirical relationship between DEPTH averaged over the 
1960-1989 period and three growth indicators also averaged over the 1960-1989 period, G.  The 
three growth indicators are as follows: (1) the average rate of real per capita GDP growth, (2) the 
average rate of growth in the capital stock per person, and (3) total productivity growth, which is   16
a "Solow residual" defined as real per capita GDP growth minus (0.3) times the growth rate of 
the capital stock per person.  The analyses include a matrix of conditioning information, X, that 
controls for other factors associated with economic growth (e.g., income per capita, education, 
political stability, indicators of exchange rate, trade, fiscal, and monetary policy).  KL estimated 
the following regressions: 
 
  G ( j )   =   a + bDEPTH  +  cX + u.       
 
Adapted from KL, Table 1 indicates that there is a statistically significant and 
economically large relationship between DEPTH and (a) long-run real per capita growth, (b) 
capital accumulation, and (c) productivity growth.  The coefficient on DEPTH implies that a 
country that increased DEPTH from the mean of the slowest growing quartile of countries (0.2) 
to the mean of the fastest growing quartile of countries (0.6) would have increased its per capita 
growth rate by almost 1 percent per year.  This is large.  The difference between the slowest 
growing 25 percent of countries and the fastest growing quartile of countries is about five 
percent per annum over this 30-year period.  Thus, the rise in DEPTH alone eliminates 20 
percent of this growth difference.  The illustrative example, however, ignores causality and the 
issue of how to increase DEPTH. 
KL also examine whether the value of financial depth in 1960 predicts the rate of 
economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth over the next 30 years.  As 
shown in Table 2, the regressions indicate that financial depth in 1960 is a good predictor of 
subsequent rates of economic growth, physical capital accumulation, and economic efficiency 
improvements over the next 30 years even after controlling for income, education, and measures   17
of monetary, trade, and fiscal policy.  Thus, finance does not simply follow growth; financial 
development predicts long-run growth. 
While improving on past work, there are methodological and interpretation problems 
with the KL analyses.  As noted in the Introduction, the proxy measures for financial 
development, DEPTH and the alternative measures, do not directly measure the ability of the 
financial system to (i) overcome information asymmetries and funnel credit to worthy firms, (ii) 
monitor managers effectively and exert corporate governance efficiently, (iii) provide risk 
management services, or (iv) facilitate exchange and the pooling of savings.  This lowers the 
confidence one has in interpreting the results as establishing a link running from financial 
development to economic growth.  Also, while KL show that finance predicts growth, they do 
not deal formally with the issue of causality.  Finally, KL only focus on one segment of the 
financial system, banks.  They do not incorporate measures of other components of national 
financial systems.   
2.2. Cross-country studies: Stock markets and banks 
  Following Atje and Jovanovic (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998, henceforth LZ) add 
measures of stock market and banking development to cross-country studies of growth.  Thus, 
they simultaneously examine two components of the financial system: banks and equity markets.  
This provides information on the independent impact of stock markets and banks on economic 
growth.  Thus, these analyses help policymakers set reform priorities and influence debates on 
the comparative importance of different segments of the financial sector (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2001). 
  LZ construct numerous measures of stock market development to assess the relationship 
between stock market development and economic growth, capital accumulation, and   18
productivity.  In this paper, we focus on one of the LZ liquidity indicators: the turnover ratio.  
This equals the total value of shares traded on a country's stock exchanges divided by stock 
market capitalization (the value of listed shares on the country's exchanges).  The turnover ratio 
measures trading relative to the size of the market.  All else equal, therefore, differences in 
trading frictions will influence the turnover ratio. LZ confirm their results using an assortment of 
stock market development indicators.
1 
There are difficulties in measuring liquidity, however. First, LZ do not measure the direct 
costs of conducting equity transactions.  LZ simply measure trading, which may reflect 
differences in the arrival of news and how heterogeneous agents interpret this information.  Thus, 
while we would like a proxy of the ease of trading at posted prices, the data provide only a 
measure of actual transactions. Second, stock markets may do more than provide liquidity.  For 
instance, stock markets may provide mechanisms for hedging and trading the idiosyncratic risk 
associated with individual projects, firms, industries, sectors, and countries. Thus, focusing on 
liquidity may omit important services provided by equity markets and therefore mis-measure 
stock market development.  Third, the turnover ratio measures domestic stock transactions on a 
country's national stock exchanges.  The physical location of the stock market, however, may not 
necessarily matter for the provision of liquidity.   This measurement problem will increase if 
economies become more financially integrated and firms list and issue shares on foreign 
exchanges.   
                                                 
1 Levine and Zervos (1998) examine three additional measures of liquidity.  First, the value traded ratio equals the 
total value of domestic stocks traded on domestic exchanges as a share of GDP.  This measures trading relative to 
the size of the economy.  The next two measures of liquidity measure trading relative to stock price movements: (1) 
the value traded ratio divided by stock return volatility, and (2) the turnover ratio divided by stock return volatility.  
They also examine a measure of stock market integration.  While a vast literature examines the pricing of risk, there 
exists very little empirical evidence that directly links risk diversification services with long-run economic growth.  
LZ do not find a strong link between economic growth and the ability of investors to diversify risk internationally.   19
The turnover ratio exhibits substantial cross-country variability.  Very active markets 
such as Japan and the United States had turnover ratios of almost 0.5 during the period 1976-93.  
Less liquid markets, such as Bangladesh, Chile, and Egypt had turnover ratios of 0.06 or less. 
As summarized in Table 3, LZ find that the initial level of stock market liquidity and the 
initial level of banking development (Bank Credit) are positively and significantly correlated 
with future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth over the 
next 18 years even after controlling for initial income, schooling, inflation, government 
spending, the black market exchange rate premium, and political stability.  To measure banking 
sector development, LZ use Bank credit, which equals bank credit to the private sector as a share 
of GDP.  This measure of banking development excludes credit issued by the government and 
the central bank and excludes credits issued to the government and public enterprises.  LZ argue 
that their banking development indicator is better than KL because non-governmental financial 
intermediaries that are allocating credit to private firms are more likely to improve the efficiency 
of credit allocation and the monitoring of firms than intermediaries that are allocating money to 
the government and public enterprises. 
These results are consistent with models that emphasize that stock market liquidity 
facilitates long-run growth (Levine, 1991; Bencivenga et al., 1995) and not supportive of models 
that emphasize the negative aspects of stock markets liquidity (Bhide, 1993). Furthermore, the 
results do lend much support to models that emphasize the tensions between bank-based and 
market-based systems.  Rather, the results suggest that stock markets provide different financial 
functions from those provided by banks, or else they would not both enter the growth regression 
significantly.   20
The sizes of the coefficients are economically meaningful.  For example, the estimated 
coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in initial stock market liquidity (0.30) 
would increase per capita GDP growth by 0.80 percentage points per year (2.7*0.3).  
Accumulating over 18 years, this implies real GDP per capita would have been over 15 
percentage points higher by the end of the sample.  Similarly, the estimated coefficient on Bank 
Credit implies a correspondingly large growth effect.  That is, a one-standard deviation increase 
in Bank Credit (0.5) would increase growth by 0.7 percentage point per year (1.3*0.5).  Taken 
together, the results imply that if a country had increased both stock market liquidity and bank 
development by one-standard deviation, then by the end of the 18-year sample period, real per 
capita GDP would have been almost 30 percent higher and productivity would have been almost 
25 percent higher.   
Critically for policymakers, LZ do not find that stock market size, as measured by market 
capitalization divided by GDP, is robustly correlated with growth.  Simply listing on the national 
stock exchange does not necessarily foster resource allocation.  Rather, it is the ability to trade 
ownership of the economy’s productive technologies that influences resource allocation and 
growth. 
While LZ incorporate stock markets into the analysis of economic growth, there are 
problems.  First, they do not deal formally with the issue of causality.  Second, while Levine and 
Zervos (1998) include stock markets, they exclude other components of the financial sector, e.g., 
bond markets and the financial services provided by nonfinancial firms.  Third, as discussed 
above, the turnover ratio may not accurately measure the ability to trade shares and may miss 
other important services provided by equity markets. 
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  2.3. Using instrumental variables to deal with simultaneity bias 
  To assess whether the finance-growth relationship is driven by simultaneity bias, recent 
research uses instrumental variables to extract the exogenous component of financial 
development.  To do this, one needs instrumental variables that explain cross-country differences 
in financial development but are uncorrelated with economic growth beyond their link with 
financial development.  Then, one can use standard instrumental variable procedures to examine 
the finance-growth relationship while formally controlling for endogeneity. 
  Levine (1998, 1999) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) use the La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (henceforth LLSV, 1998) measures of legal origin as instrumental 
variables.  In particular, LLSV (1998) show that legal origin – whether a country’s 
Commercial/Company law derives from British, French, German, or Scandinavian law – 
importantly shapes national approaches to laws concerning creditors and the efficiency with 
which those laws are enforced.  Since finance is based on contracts, legal origins that produce 
laws that protect the rights of external investors and enforce those rights effectively will do a 
correspondingly better job at promoting financial development.  Indeed, LLSV (1998) trace the 
effect of legal origin to laws and enforcement and then to the development of financial 
intermediaries.  Since most countries obtained their legal systems through occupation and 
colonization, the legal origin variables may be plausibly treated as exogenous. 
  Formally, consider the generalized method of moments (GMM) regression: 
    G(j) = a  + bF(i) + cX +  u. 
G(j) is real per capita GDP growth over the 1960-95 period.  The legal origin indicators, Z, are 
used as instrumental variables for the measures of financial development, F(i).  X is treated as an 
included exogenous variable.     22
The validity of the instrumental variables, the legal origin dummy variables, requires that 
they are uncorrelated with the error term, u, i.e., they may affect growth only through the 
financial development indicators and the variables in the conditioning information set, X.  we 
test the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term using 
Hansen’s (1982) test of the overidentifying restrictions (OIR-test).  If the regression specification 
“passes” the test, then we cannot reject the statistical and economic significance of the estimated 
coefficient on financial intermediary development as indicating an effect running from financial 
development to per capita GDP growth.  
  In using instrumental variables, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine, and 
Loayza (2000) also develop a new measure of overall financial development.  The new measure, 
Private Credit, equals the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided 
by GDP.  The measure (i) isolates credit issued to the private sector, (ii) excludes credit issued to 
governments, government agencies, and public enterprises, and (iii) excludes credits issued by 
central banks.  Unlike the LZ Bank Credit measure, Private Credit includes credits issued by 
financial intermediaries that are not classified as deposit money banks by the International 
Monetary Fund.   
  As shown in Table 4 (IV-Cross-Country), Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) find a very 
strong connection between the exogenous component of financial intermediary development and 
long-run economic growth when using cross-country instrumental variables.  They also show 
that the exogenous component of financial development is linked with both capital accumulation 
and productivity growth.  Using various conditioning information sets, i.e., different X’s, the 
results still hold.  Furthermore, the data do not reject Hansen’s (1982) test of the over-identifying 
restrictions.  Also, Levine (2000) confirms these findings using the La Porta et al. (2001)   23
measure of privately owned banks.  Thus, the exogenous component of privately owned banks is 
positively associated with economic growth. 
  These results suggest an economically large impact of financial development on growth.  
For example, India’s value of Private Credit over the period 1960-95 was 19.5 percent of GDP, 
while the mean value for developing countries was 25 percent of GDP.  The estimated 
coefficient suggests that an exogenous improvement in Private Credit in India that had pushed it 
to the sample mean for developing countries would have accelerated real per capita GDP growth 
by an additional 0.6 of a percentage point per year.  These types of conceptual experiments must 
be treated as illustrative because they do not account for how to increase financial intermediary 
development. 
  While these analyses confront the causality issue, problems remain.  Besides the 
problems noted earlier with constructing accurate measures of financial development, these 
cross-country instrumental variable analyses only consider the endogenous determination of the 
financial development.  They treat the other explanatory variables as exogenous.  Furthermore, 
the cross-country instrumental variable studies do not simultaneously consider the independent 
role of equity markets. 
  2.4. Panel studies of finance and growth 
2.4.1. Why use panel techniques? 
  In light of the problems associated with purely cross-country growth regressions, Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck (2000, henceforth LLB) use a GMM estimator developed for panel data 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995).  In comparison to purely cross-country 
approaches, the panel approach has three important advantages and one particular disadvantage.  
To see these, consider the panel regression specified as follows: 
y(i,t) = aX
1(i,t) + bX
2(i,t) + C(i) + T(t) + u(i,t)   24
where y represents growth, X
1 represents a set of lagged explanatory variables and X
2 a set of 
contemporaneous explanatory variables, C is an unobserved country-specific effect, T is a time-
specific effect, u is the time-varying error term, and i and t represent country and (5-year) time 
period, respectively.   
  The first benefit from moving to a panel is the ability to exploit the time-series and cross-
sectional variation in the data.  LLB construct a panel that consists of data for 77 countries over 
the period 1960-95.  The data are averaged over seven non-overlapping five-year periods.  
Moving to a panel incorporates the variability of the time-series dimension, which allows the 
panel approach to exploit substantial additional variability. 
  A second benefit from moving to a panel is that in the purely cross-sectional regression, 
the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the error term so that correlation between C(i) 
and the explanatory variables results in biased coefficient estimates.
2  To control for the presence 
of unobserved country-specific effects, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose to first-difference the 
regression equation to eliminate the country-specific effect and then use instrumental variables to 
control for endogeneity.  This approach eliminates biases due to country-specific omitted 
variables. 
  The third benefit from using a panel is that it overcomes the problem that the pure cross-
country instrumental variable work does not control for the potential endogeneity of all the 
regressors. This can lead to inappropriate inferences on the coefficient on financial development.  
The panel estimator uses instruments based on previous realizations of the explanatory variables 
to consider the potential endogeneity of the other regressors. 
                                                 
2 Furthermore, if the lagged dependent variable is included in X
1 (which is the norm in cross-country regressions), 
then the country-specific effect is certainly correlated with X
1.     25
  An important disadvantage from to moving to panel data is that it means employing data 
averaged over five-year periods.  Yet, we are seeking to assess the connection between financial 
development and long-run growth.  To the extent that five years does not adequately proxy for 
long-run growth, the panel methods may be less precise in assessing the finance growth 
relationship than methods based on lower frequency data. 
2.4.2. Results with financial intermediation 
LLB use panel techniques to study the relationship between financial intermediary 
development and growth, while Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) extend this work to evaluate 
the relationship between financial development and the sources of growth, i.e., productivity 
growth and physical capital accumulation.  They use many indicators of financial intermediary 
development and various conditioning information sets to assess robustness (Levine and Renelt, 
1992).  Table 4 summarizes these results using the Private Credit measure of financial 
development described above. 
  Table 4 indicates a positive relationship between the exogenous component of financial 
development and economic growth, productivity growth, and capital accumulation.  The 
regressions pass the standard specification tests for panel regressions.  Remarkably, the 
coefficient estimates for the panel estimates are very similar to those obtained using pure cross-
sectional instrumental variables.  Thus, the large, positive relationship between economic growth 
and Private Credit does not appear to be driven by simultaneity bias, omitted country-specific 
effects, or other problems plaguing cross-country growth regressions.
3   
                                                 
3 Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) go on to argue that the finance-capital accumulation link is not robust to 
alternative specifications, but financial development is robustly linked with both economic growth and productivity 
growth.   26
2.4.3. Stock markets, banks, and growth revisited 
  Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) extend the Levine and Zervos (1998) study of stock 
markets, banks, and growth to a panel context.  They use annual data and the panel difference 
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  Thus, they jointly study the impact of bank 
and equity markets on economic growth. 
Beck and Levine (2002) build on Rousseau and Wachtel (2000).  Beck and Levine (2002) 
(i) use data averaged over five-years periods to abstract from business-cycle fluctuations, (ii) 
employ more recent panel procedures that avoid biases associated with difference, and (iii) 
extend the sample through 1998, which mitigates the potential effect of the Asian stock market 
boom in the 1990s on the results.   
Table 5 indicates that the exogenous component of both stock market development and 
bank development help predict economic growth.  Based on Beck and Levine (2002), Table 5 
also presents simple OLS regressions.  As shown, the coefficient estimates from the two methods 
are very similar.  The panel procedure passes the standard specification tests, which increases 
confidence in the assumptions underlying the econometric methodology.  While not shown, Beck 
and Levine (2002) find that stock market capitalization is not closely associated with growth, 
which confirms the earlier results by Levine and Zervos (1998).  Thus, it is not listing per se that 
is important for growth; rather, it is the ability of agents to exchange ownership claims on an 
economy’s productive technologies that matters.   
  The Table 5 estimates are economically meaningful and consistent with magnitudes 
obtained using different methods.  If Mexico’s Turnover Ratio had been at the average of the 
OECD countries (68%) instead of the actual 36% during the period 1996-98, it would have 
grown 0.6 percentage points faster per year. Similarly, if its Bank Credit had been at the average   27
of all OECD countries (71%) instead of the actual 16%, it would have grown 0.6 percentage 
points faster per year.  These results suggest that the exogenous component of both bank and 
stock market development have an economically large impact on economic growth.  Note, 
however, using quarterly data and vector autoregressive techniques, Arestis, Demetriades, and 
Luintel (2000) find that the economic effect of stock market liquidity on growth is positive and 
significant, but smaller economically than that found in Levine and Zervos (1998), Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2000), and Beck and Levine (2002).  While differences in data frequency, country 
coverage, sample period and econometric technique may account for the differences, future 
works needs to clarify the economic impact of stock market development on economic growth.  
  2.5. Microeconomic studies of finance and growth 
  Industry-level and firm-level data have also been brought to bear on the question of 
whether financial development promotes economic growth.  By circumventing weaknesses with 
cross-country and panel studies, the microeconomic research seeks to resolve causality issues 
and to document in greater detail the mechanisms, if any, through which finance influences 
economic growth. 
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2.5.1. Industry-level studies 
In a very influential study, Rajan and Zingales (henceforth RZ, 1998) use industry-level 
data to study the mechanisms through financial development may influence economic growth 
and to deal rigorously with causality issues.  They argue that better-developed financial systems 
ameliorate market frictions that make it difficult for firms to obtain external finance.  Thus, 
industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance should benefit disproportionately 
more from greater financial development than industries that are not naturally heavy users of 
external finance.  If researchers can identify those industries that rely heavily on external finance 
in an economy with few market frictions – i.e., “naturally heavy users” of external finance -- 
then this establishes a natural test: Do industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance 
grow faster in economies with better developed financial systems?  If they do, then this supports 
the view that financial development spurs growth by facilitating the flow of external finance. 
RZ work under three maintained assumptions: (1) financial markets in the U.S. are 
relatively frictionless, (2) in a frictionless financial system, technological factors influence the 
degree to which an industry uses external finance, and (3) the technological factors influencing 
external finance are reasonably constant across countries.  RZ use the external financing of 
industries in the U.S. as a benchmark of the external financing needs of industries in a 
comparatively frictionless financial system.  They, then assess whether industries that are 
naturally heavy users of external finance grow comparatively faster in countries that are more 
financially developed.   
  RZ develop methods to examine whether industries that are naturally heavy users of 
external finance grow faster in financially developed economies.  Consider the equation.  
Growth(i,k) = aC + bI + cShare(i,k) + d[External(k)*FD(i)] + u(i,k)   29
Growth(i,k) is the average annual growth rate of value added in industry k and country i, over the 
period 1980-90.  C and I are matrices of country and industry dummies for all countries and 
industries, respectively. Share(i,k) is the share of industry k in manufacturing in country i in 
1980.  External(k) is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for U.S. 
firms in the industry k between 1980-90.  FD(i) is an indicator of financial development for 
country i.  RZ interact the external dependence of an industry (External) with financial 
development (FD), where the estimated coefficient on the interaction, d, is the focus of their 
analysis.  Thus, if d is significant and positive, then this implies that an increase in financial 
development (FD) will induce a bigger impact on industrial growth (Growth(i,k)) if this industry 
relies heavily on external finance (External(k)) than if this industry is not a naturally heavy user 
of external finance.  
This approach allows RZ (1) to study a particular mechanism, external finance, through 
which finance operates rather than simply assessing links between finance and growth and (2) to 
exploit within-country differences concerning industries.   
RZ use data on 36 industries across 41 countries.  To measure financial development, RZ 
examine (a) total capitalization, which equals the summation of stock market capitalization and 
domestic credit as a share of GDP and (b) accounting standards.  As RZ discuss, there are 
problems with these measures.  Stock market capitalization does not capture the actual amount of 
capital raised in equity markets.  RZ use the accounting standards measure as a positive signal of 
the ease with which firms can raise external funds, while noting that it is not a direct measure 
external financing.  Beck and Levine (2000) confirm the RZ findings using alternative measures 
of financial development.   30
As summarized in Table 6, RZ find that the coefficient estimate for the interaction 
between external dependence and total capitalization measure, External(k)*Total 
Capitalization(i), is positive and statistically significant at the one-percent level.  This implies 
that an increase in financial development disproportionately boosts the growth of industries that 
are naturally heavy users of external finance. 
RZ note that the economic magnitude is large.  Compare Machinery, which is an industry 
at the 75
th percentile of dependence (0.45), with Beverages, which has low dependence (0.08) 
and is at the 25
th percentile of dependence. Now, consider Italy, which has high total 
capitalization (0.98) at the 75
th percentile of the sample, and the Philippines, which is at the 25
th 
percentile of total capitalization with a value of 0.46.  Due to differences in financial 
development, the coefficient estimates predict that Machinery should grow 1.3 percent faster 
than Beverages in Italy in comparison to the Philippines.  The actual difference is 3.4, so the 
estimated value of 1.3 is substantial.  Thus, financial development has a big impact on industrial 
growth by facilitating external finance.   
 
2.5.2. Firm level studies 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (henceforth DM, 1998) use firm-level data and test 
whether financial development influences the degree to which firms are constrained from 
investing in profitable growth opportunities.  They focus on the use of long-term debt and 
external equity in funding firm growth.  As in RZ, DM focuses on a particular mechanism 
through which finance influences growth: does greater financial development remove 
impediments to firm growth.  In contrast to RZ, DM estimate the external financing needs of 
each individual firm in the sample.     31
Questioning the assumptions underlying Rajan and Zingales (1998), DM argue that it is 
important to allow for differences in the amount of external financing needed by firms in the 
same industry in different countries.  These differences may arise because firms in different 
countries employ different technologies, because profit rates may differ across countries, or 
because investment opportunities and demand may differ.   
To control for differences in the need for external finance at the firm-level, DM calculate 
the rate at which each firm can grow using (1) only its internal funds and (2) only its internal 
funds and short-term borrowing.  They then compute the percentage of firms that grow at rates 
that exceed each of these two estimated rates.  This yields estimates of the proportion of firms in 
each economy relying on external financing to grow. 
For the largest publicly traded manufacturing firms in 26 countries, DM estimate a firm’s 
potential growth rate using the textbook “percentage of sales” financial planning model (Higgins 
1974).
4  This approach relates a firm’s growth rate of sales to its need for investment funds, 
based on three simplifying assumptions. First, the ratio of assets used in production to sales is 
constant. Second, the firm’s profits per unit of sales are constant. Finally, the economic 
deprecation rate equals the accounting depreciation rate.   
Based on these important maintained assumptions, DM compute the short-term financed 
growth rate STFGt as the maximum growth rate that can be obtained if the firm reinvests all its 
earnings and obtains enough short-term external resources to maintain the ratio of its short-term 
liabilities to assets.   
Then, DM calculate the proportion of firms whose growth rates exceed the estimate of 
the maximum growth rate that can be financed by relying only on internal and short-term 
financing, PROPORTION_FASTER.  There is quire a bit of cross-country variation in the   32
PROPORTION_FASTER.  For instance, in Turkey, South Africa, and Pakistan, less than 30 
percent of the firms have growth rates that exceed the estimate of the maximum growth rate that 
can be financed by relying only on internal and short-term financing.  In contrast, in Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, and Thailand, PROPORTION_FASTER is greater than 50 percent.  Put 
differently, in these countries, more than half the firms require long-term financing to finance 
their growth according to the “percentage of sales” financial planning model. 
To analyze whether financial development spurs firm growth, DM run the following 
cross-country regression regressions 
PROPORTION_FASTER = a + bFD(i,t) + cCV(i,t) + u(i,t) 
where FD is a variety of measures of financial development, CV is a set of control variables, and  
u is the error term.  To measure financial development, DM use (a) the ratio of market 
capitalization to GDP (Market Capitalization/GDP), (b) Turnover, which equals the total value of 
shares traded divided by market capitalization, and (c) Bank Assets/GDP, which equals the ratio 
of domestic assets of deposit banks divided by GDP.  Thus, DM include all domestic assets of 
deposit banks, not just credit to the private sector.  As control variables, DM experiment with 
different combinations of control variables, including economic growth, inflation, the average 
market to book value of firms in the economy, government subsidies to firms in the economy, 
the net fixed assets divided by total assets of firms in the economy, the level real per capita GDP, 
the law and order tradition of the economy. 
  As summarized in Table 7, DM (1998) find that both banking system development and 
stock market liquidity are positively associated with the excess growth of firms.  Thus, in 
countries with high Turnover and high Bank Assets/GDP a larger proportion of firms is growing 
at a level that requires access to external sources of long-term capital, holding other things 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Maksimovic (2001) confirm the findings using an extended sample.     33
constant.  Note, consistent with Levine and Zervos (1998), the size of the domestic stock markets 
is not related to the excess growth of firms.  After conducting a wide-array of robustness checks, 
DM conclude that the proportion of firms that grow at rates exceeding the rate at which each 
firm can grow with only retained earnings and short-term borrowing is positively associated with 
stock market liquidity and banking system size. 
  2.6. Country case studies  
Dropping the cross-country dimension and focusing on an individual country often 
increases the confidence in the results by reducing potential biases due to measurement error and 
reducing concerns about omitted variables and endogeneity.  In a study of individual regions of 
Italy, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2002) use a household dataset and examine the effect of 
differences in local financial development on economic activity across different regions.  They 
find that local financial development enhances the probability that an individual starts a business, 
increases industrial competition, and promotes growth of firms.  And these results are stronger 
for smaller firms which cannot easily raise funds outside of the local area.  Another example is 
Haber’s (1997) historical comparison of industrial and capital market development in Brazil, 
Mexico and the United States between 1830 and 1930.  He uses firm level data to illustrate that 
international differences in financial development significantly affected the rate of industrial 
expansion. 
Perhaps one of the cleanest ways of dealing with identification problems is to focus on a 
particular policy change in a specific country and evaluate its impact. One example of this 
approach is Jayaratne and Strahan’s (1996) investigation of the impact of bank branch reform in 
individual states of the United States.  Since early 1970s, U.S. states started relaxing 
impediments on their intrastate branching. Using a difference-in-difference methodology,   34
Jayaratne and Strahan estimate the change in economic growth rates after branch reform relative 
to a control group of states that did not reform.  They show that bank branch reform boosted 
bank-lending quality and accelerated real per capita growth rates.   In another study Bertrand, 
Schoar and Thesmar (2004) provide firm-level evidence from France that shows the impact of 
1985 deregulation eliminating government intervention in bank lending decisions fostered 
greater competition in the credit market, inducing an increase in allocative efficiency across 
firms.   
Of course focusing on individual country cases often raises the question how applicable 
the results are in different country settings.  Nevertheless, these careful country-level analyses 
boost our confidence in the link between financial development and growth that is suggested by 
the cross-country studies. Unfortunately many potential causal factors of development interest do 
not vary much within a country, and exogenous policy changes do not occur often enough.  
2.7. Summary and qualifications 
While still subject to qualifications and opposing views, accumulating evidence suggests 
that both financial intermediaries and markets matter for growth and that reverse causality alone 
is not driving this relationship.  Above, we have already discussed the identification problem and 
how the literature addressed this issue through the use of instrumental variables, panel 
techniques, documenting the mechanisms through which finance affects growth by using micro 
data, and finally through in-depth analysis of individual country cases and the impact of specific 
financial sector reforms. 
Besides issues of identification, another problem that plagues the literature on finance 
and development has been the difficulty of in measuring financial development, which we have 
already mentioned.  Banking problems provide a good example of how measurement issues can   35
complicate the analysis. For example, when banking systems grow too quickly, booms are 
inevitably followed by busts, in which case size and depth may actually reflect policy distortions 
rather than development.  Hence, it is not surprising that the econometric link between banking 
depth and aggregate economic growth has weakened in recent years, in particular when the data 
set includes the 1997-98 East Asia crisis (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2005) or is limited to turbulent 
Latin American countries (Loayza and Ranciere, 2005). Designing empirical proxies that capture 
more closely what is meant by financial development is an important area of further research.  
For example, recently there have been efforts to define and measure the access dimension of 
financial development, which is widely stressed in theory but mostly overlooked in empirical 
applications due to lack of availability of data (World Bank, 2008). 
There are also issues related to non-linearities and threshold effects.  For example, below 
a certain level of development, small differences in financial development do not seem to help 
growth (Rioja and Valev, 2004a and b). Distinguishing between short-run and long-run effects of 
financial development is also important.  Loayza and Ranciere (2005) estimate both effects using 
a pooled mean group estimator. While they confirm a positive long -run effect, they also identify 
a negative short-run effect, where short-term surges in bank lending can actually signal the on-
set of financial crisis as discussed above.  Also, financial development may boost income and 
allow developing countries catch up, but not lead to an increase in the long run growth rate.  
Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) develop a model that predicts that low-income 
countries with low financial development will continue to fall behind the rest, whereas those 
reaching the higher level of financial development will converge.  Their empirical results 
confirm that financial development helps an economy converge faster, but that there is no effect 
on steady-state growth.    36
Another challenge to the finance and growth literature comes in the form of individual 
country outliers.  For example, China is often mentioned as a counterexample to the findings in 
finance and growth literature (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005a,b).  Despite weaknesses in its formal 
banking system, China is one of the fastest growing economies in the world.   Informal systems 
might substitute for formal systems.  Indeed, in China, inter-provincial differences in growth 
rates are highly correlated with banking debt, but negatively (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Boyreau-
Debray and Wei, 2005).  This emphasizes the importance of focusing on allocation of credit to 
the private sector, as opposed to all bank intermediation.  Hence, mobilizing and pouring funds 
into the declining parts of the Chinese state enterprise system, as the main Chinese banks were 
doing, has not been growth promoting.  However, focusing on small and medium firms – which 
account for the most dynamic part of the Chinese economy – shows that those firms receiving 
bank credit in recent years did tend to grow more quickly compared to those receiving funds 
from informal sources (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2007). This suggests that the 
ability of informal mechanisms to substitute for formal financial systems might be exaggerated. 
In summary, despite the weaknesses and qualifications, the accumulation of evidence 
suggests that financial development is crucial for growth.  While the evidence may not convince 
all skeptics, it is strong enough to motivate the policymakers to prioritize financial sector policies 
and devote attention to policy determinants of financial development as a mechanism for 
promoting growth. 
3. Determinants of Financial Development 
  In the first part of the paper we have shown that the bulk of the empirical literature on 
finance and development suggests that well-developed financial systems play an independent 
and causal role in promoting long run economic growth.  If finance is important for   37
development, why do some countries have growth-promoting financial systems while others do 
not?  And what can governments do to develop their financial systems?     
  3.1. Historical determinants 
  Given the important role finance plays in promoting development, there is a growing 
body of research that examines determinants of financial development.  One area of this line of 
research focuses on historical determinants of financial development and studies the legal, 
political, cultural, ethnic and geographic differences across countries that may shape 
development of financial institutions and markets. 
  La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) stress that differences in legal traditions shape the laws 
and enforcement mechanisms that protect the rights of outside investors, thus influencing 
financial development. Focusing on the differences between the two most influential legal 
traditions, the British Common law and the French Civil law, this view holds that legal traditions 
differ in terms of the priority they attach to protecting the rights of private investors against the 
state.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003b and 2005) also show that legal system 
adaptability is crucial and more flexible legal systems do a better job at meeting the continuously 
changing financial needs of the economy and promoting financial development.   
  Haber (2004), Pagano and Volpin (2001), Rajan and Zingales (2003) focus on how 
political economy forces shape national policies toward financial development and influence and 
change the political power of entrenched incumbents. According to this view, closed political 
systems are more likely to impede the development of financial systems that promote 
competition and threaten entrenched powers than open political systems.  This is because 
centralized and powerful states are more responsive to and efficient at implementing policies that   38
protect the interests of the elite than decentralized and competitive political systems with an 
assortment of checks and balances. 
   Stulz and Williamson (2003) emphasize the role of religion and culture in influencing 
development of institutions.  Many scholars argue that religion shapes national views regarding 
institutions, including financial institutions.  For example, it is said that the Catholic Church 
fosters “vertical bonds of authority” rather than “horizontal bonds of fellowship.”  This view 
suggests that Catholic and Muslim countries tend to develop cultures that maintain control, 
limiting competition and private property rights.  Alesina et al. (2003) and Easterly and Levine 
(2003) focus on ethnic differences, instead.  They argue that in highly ethnically diverse 
economies, the group that comes to power tends to implement policies that expropriate 
resources, restrict the rights of other groups, and prevent the growth of industries or sectors that 
threaten the ruling group.    
Others stress the role of initial geographic endowments in determining attitudes towards 
development of different institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001).  Acemoglu et al. (2001) focus on the disease environment and argue that the 
degree to which Europeans could settle in a land influenced the choice of colonization strategy 
with long lasting implications on institutions. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) focus on the 
geographic endowments and study the differential development of institutions in North America.  
They argue that the geographic conditions in the North which favored production of wheat and 
maize fostered a large middle class with egalitarian institutions, whereas the conditions in the 
South which led to the production of rice and sugarcane also led to the rise of a powerful elite 
and more closed institutions.    39
  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003a) investigate the relative importance of these 
historical determinants of financial development and find that differences in initial endowments 
and legal origins are robustly associated with development of financial institutions and markets.  
Thus, countries with common law origins with better protection of outside investors were more 
likely to develop financial institutions. But colonization strategy also mattered: Tropical 
environments, inhospitable to European settlement, were more likely to foster extractive 
institutions as opposed to institutions that promote financial development.
5    
  Perhaps most important from a policy viewpoint however, is the government’s role in 
building efficient and inclusive financial systems.  Hence, in the next section, we turn to the 
evidence on the role of regulations and economic policies in influencing financial development. 
  3.2. Role of policies 
  Besides historical forces, government policies shape the structure and functioning of 
financial systems.  Specifically, the degree of political and macroeconomic stability and the 
operation of legal, regulatory, and information systems all influence the financial contracting 
environment. Furthermore, governments influence the ownership of financial institutions as well 
as the degree of contestability by foreign and domestic sources, which affect the functioning of 
financial systems and the degree to which individuals have access to financial services.  We now 
discuss each of these areas of government influence in greater detail. 
3.2.1. Political and macroeconomic environment 
Political turmoil may lead to macroeconomic instability and deterioration in business 
conditions. Civil strife and war destroys capital and infrastructure, and expropriations may 
follow military takeovers.  Corruption and crime thrive in such environments, increasing cost of 
                                                 
5 Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2006a, b) instead focus on property rights protection and  show that 
legal origin is not a robust determinant whereas ethnic fractionalization is.   40
doing business and creating uncertainty about property rights.  Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel 
(2005) show that for low-income countries political instability and corruption have a detrimental 
effect on financial development.  Investigating the business environment for 80 countries using 
firm level survey data, Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) find that political 
instability and crime are important obstacles to firm growth, particularly in African and 
Transition countries.  Further, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004a) show that the 
negative impact of corruption on firm growth is most pronounced for smaller firms.   
  Given a stable political system, well functioning financial systems also require fiscal 
discipline and stable macroeconomic policies on the part of governments.  Monetary and fiscal 
policies affect the taxation of financial intermediaries and provision of financial services 
(Bencivenga and Smith, 1992; Huybens and Smith, 1999; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992 and 
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).  Often large financing requirements of governments crowd out 
private investment by increasing the required returns on government securities and absorbing the 
bulk of the savings mobilized by the financial system. Bank profitability does not necessarily 
suffer given the high yields on these securities, but the ability of the financial system to allocate 
resources efficiently is severely curtailed.  Empirical studies have also shown that countries with 
lower and more stable inflation rates experience higher levels of banking and stock market 
development (Boyd, Levine and Smith, 2001) and high inflation and real interest rates are 
associated with higher probability of systemic banking crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998 and 2005). 
3.2.2. Legal and information infrastructure 
Financial systems also require developed legal and information infrastructures to function 
well.  Firms’ ability to raise external finance in the formal financial system is quite limited if the   41
rights of outside investors are not protected. Outside investors are reluctant to invest in 
companies if they will not be able to exert corporate governance and protect their investment 
from controlling shareholders/owners or the management of the companies.  Thus, protection of 
property rights and effective enforcement of contracts are critical elements in financial system 
development.   
Empirical evidence shows firms are able to access external finance in countries where 
legal enforcement is stronger (La Porta et al., 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005), and that  better creditor protection increases 
credit to the private sector (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2005).  More effective legal systems 
allow more flexible and adaptable conflict resolution, increasing firms’ access to finance 
(Djankov et al., 2003; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2005).  In countries where legal 
systems are more effective, financial systems have lower interest rate spreads and are more 
efficient (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004; Laeven and Majnoni, 2005).    
Timely availability of good quality information is equally important, since this helps 
reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. The collection, processing and 
use of borrowing history and other information relevant to household and small business lending 
– credit registries - have been rapidly growing in both the public and private sectors (see Miller, 
2003, for an overview).  Computer technology has also greatly improved the amount of 
information that can be analyzed to assess creditworthiness, such as through credit scoring 
techniques.  Governments can play an important role in this process, and while establishment of 
public credit registries may discourage private entry, in several cases it has actually encouraged 
private registries to enter in order to provide a wider and deeper range of services. Governments 
are also important in creating and supporting the legal system needed for conflict resolution and   42
contract enforcement, and strengthening accounting infrastructures to enable financial 
development. 
Empirical results show that the volume of bank credit is significantly higher in countries 
with more information sharing (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; and Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer, 
2007). Firms also report lower financing obstacles with better credit information (Love and 
Mylenko, 2004). Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2005) find that better access to information 
and speedier enforcement of contracts are associated with deeper financial systems even in low-
income countries. Indeed, compared to high-income countries, in lower income countries it is 
credit information more than legal enforcement that matters (Djankov et al., 2007). 
3.2.3. Regulation and supervision 
For as long as there have been banks, there have also been governments regulating them.  
While most economists agree that there is a role for government in the regulation and 
supervision of financial systems, the extent of this involvement is an issue of active debate 
(Barth, Caprio and Levine; 2004, 2006).  One extreme view is the laissez-faire or invisible-hand 
approach, where there is no role for government in the financial system, and markets are 
expected to monitor and discipline financial institutions.  This approach has been criticized for 
ignoring market failures as depositors, particularly small depositors, often find it too costly to be 
effective monitors.
6  Thus, governments often act as delegated monitors for depositors, 
exploiting economies of scale to overcome costly information problems. 
On the other hand, many advocate a more interventionist approach, where government 
regulation is seen as the solution to market failures (Stigler, 1971).  According to this view, 
                                                 
6 Small depositors have to be protected, but banks also need to be protected against runs by uninformed depositors 
that may precipitate forced liquidations.  Further, market imperfections may also prevent optimal resource 
allocation, as powerful banks may extract rents from firms, reducing their incentives to undertake profitable 
investments.  See Levine (2005) for further discussion.   43
powerful supervisors are expected to ensure stability of the financial system and guide banks in 
their business decisions through regulation and supervision.  This view relies on two crucial 
assumptions.  First, that governments know better than markets, and second, that they act in the 
best interests of the society.  To the extent that officials generally have limited knowledge and 
expertise in making business decisions and can be subject to political and regulatory capture, 
these assumptions will not be valid (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Haber et al. 2003).     
Between the two extremes lies the private empowerment view of financial regulation. 
This view simultaneously recognizes the potential importance of market failures which motivate 
government intervention, and political/regulatory failures, which suggest that supervisory 
agencies do not necessarily have incentives to ease market failures. The focus is on enabling 
markets, where there is an important role for governments in enhancing the ability and incentives 
of private agents to overcome information and transaction costs, so that private investors can 
exert effective governance over banks.  Consequently, the private empowerment view seeks to 
provide supervisors with the responsibility and authority to induce banks to disclose accurate 
information to the public, so that private agents can more effectively monitor banks (Barth, 
Caprio and Levine, 2006).   
Empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the private empowerment view.  While 
there is little evidence that empowering regulators enhances bank stability, there is evidence that 
regulations and supervisory practices that force accurate information disclosure and promote 
private sector monitoring boost the overall level of banking sector and stock market development 
(Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006).   
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006) show that bank supervisory practices that force 
accurate information disclosure ease external financing constraints of firms, while countries that   44
empower their official supervisors actually make external financing constraints more severe by 
increasing the degree of corruption in bank lending.  Consistent with these findings, Demirguc-
Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2006) investigate compliance with Basel Core Principles of 
regulation and supervision and show that only information disclosure rules have a significant, 
positive impact on bank soundness.  Finally, Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel (2005) find little 
significant impact of regulatory and supervisory practices on financial development of low-
income countries, but note that where supervisory powers matter, greater supervisory powers 
reduce financial development.  Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2006) find a similarly positive effect 
of private monitoring and disciplining for stock market development.  Laws and liability rules 
that mandate disclosure and facilitate private enforcement promote stock market development, 
while there is little evidence for a positive effect of public enforcement.   
Related to the debate on different approaches for regulation and supervision, is the 
important debate on whether prudential regulation and safety nets designed for developed 
countries can be successfully transplanted to developing countries.  Research shows that 
financial sector policy which is considered appropriate in advanced economies can prove 
ineffective or even counterproductive in weak institutional environments of developing 
countries.  For example, powerful regulators are not significantly associated with increased 
corruption in banking in countries with strong institutions that provide checks and balances, but 
lead to greater capture and corruption in lower income countries.  However, although 
empowering the markets and focusing on information disclosure are policies that promote bank 
stability most effectively in countries where there is strong rule of law, we do not observe 
negative effects of such policies even in low -income countries (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2006).  Consistent with these results, Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2006)   45
show that compliance with the information disclosure rules of Basel Core Principles promotes 
bank stability where there is a strong rule of law.  For developing countries, these results have 
important implications for which aspects of the Basel II accord (which was designed for and by 
regulators in advanced economies) to adopt and over what time period.  In particular, the 
complicated rules and procedures for determining bank capital adequacy pre-suppose expertise 
and governance conditions which simply do not exist in most low-income countries. 
Similarly, research has questioned safety net design, particularly adoption of deposit 
insurance in developing countries by highlighting the potential costs of explicit schemes –lower 
market discipline, higher financial fragility, and lower financial development – in countries 
where complementary institutions are not strong enough to keep these costs under control 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2004; Cull, Senbet and Sorge, 2005).  These findings are particularly important for 
lower income countries with underdeveloped institutions.  For example, Detragiache, Gupta and 
Tressel (2005) also find that presence of an explicit deposit insurance system does not lead to 
more deposit mobilization in low-income countries; to the contrary it is associated with lower 
levels of deposits.  Using a sample of developed and developing countries, Cecchetti and Krause 
(2004) also find that explicit deposit insurance results in less credit provision to the private 
sector.  Demirguc-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2008) summarize the cross-country evidence on the 
impact of deposit insurance and assess the policy complications that emerge in developing 
countries by reviewing individual-country experiences with DI: including issues raised by the 
EU's Deposit Insurance directive, banking reform in Russia, and policy efforts to protect 
depositors in China.   46
3.2.4. Contestability and efficiency 
Policymakers around the world frequently express concern about whether their countries’ 
bank competition policies are appropriately designed to produce well-functioning and stable 
banks.  Globalization and the resulting consolidation in banking have further spurred interest in 
this issue, leading to an active public policy debate. Competition policies in banking may involve 
difficult trade-offs.  While greater competition may enhance the efficiency of banks with positive 
implications for economic growth, greater competition may also destabilize banks with costly 
repercussions for the economy. 
Recent research has shown that contrary to conventional wisdom, the trade-offs are 
exaggerated when it comes to bank competition.  Greater competition – as captured by lower 
entry barriers, fewer regulatory restrictions on bank activities, greater banking freedom, and 
better overall institutional development – is good for efficiency, good for stability, and good for 
firms’ access to finance (Berger et al., 2004).  Also see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2004), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006), Claessens and Laeven (2004), and Demirguc-
Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004).  Indeed, regulations that interfere with competition make banks 
less efficient, more fragile, and reduce firms’ access to finance.  Thus, it seems to be a good idea 
for governments to encourage competition in banking by reducing the unnecessary impediments 
to entry and activity restrictions.  Similarly, improving the institutional environment and 
allowing greater freedoms in banking and economy in general would lead to desirable outcomes.   
Ownership is another important dimension of competition in banking. As we discuss 
further in sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, research shows that while foreign banking is associated with 
generally positive outcomes, state ownership is associated with higher margins, greater fragility 
and even less and lower quality of access.   These results highlight the importance of removing   47
impediments to foreign entry and provide further justification for bank privatization policies.  
Finally, bank concentration, which has been the focus of much policy discussion, seems not to be 
a good proxy for the overall competitive environment per se as its impact often depends on the 
existing regulatory and institutional framework. Hence governments would do better to focus on 
improving the underlying regulatory and institutional environment (as discussed in section 3.2.2 
and 3.2.3) and ownership structure to promote contestable financial systems, rather than trying to 
reduce concentration levels in banking.    
3.2.5. Government ownership of financial institutions 
A growing body of evidence shows that government ownership of banks everywhere, but 
especially in developing countries, leads to lower levels of financial development, more 
concentrated lending, and lower economic growth, and greater systemic fragility (La Porta et al., 
2002; Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2004;).  Furthermore, there is no evidence that state-owned 
banks help the poor; rather, state-owned banks tend to funnel credit to politically-favored and 
commercially unviable projects (Sapienza, 2004; Cole, 2005; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 
2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2006a).  Even in the area of access to financial 
services, recent evidence suggests that bank customers face higher barriers to credit services in 
banking systems which are predominantly government-owned (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Martinez 
Peria, 2007b).  Although in some cases, government financial institutions have entered into 
public-private partnership to overcome coordination failures and first-mover disincentives (De la 
Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler, 2007), it is unclear whether these initiatives would have been 
undertaken by the private sector if state-owned institutions did not play such a dominant role in 
the economy.  Overall, a large body of empirical evidence suggests that governments do not have 
a comparative advantage in owning financial institutions.     48
 Nevertheless,  privatization  also entails risks and needs careful design (Megginson and 
Netter, 2008). Studies of privatization processes suggest the preferred strategy is moving slowly 
but deliberately with bank privatization, while preparing state banks for sale and addressing 
weaknesses in the overall incentive environment.  On average, bank privatization tends to 
improve performance over continued state ownership, there are advantages to full rather than 
partial privatizations, and in weak institutional environments selling to a strategic investor and 
inviting foreign interests to participate in the process increase the benefits (see Clarke, Cull, 
Shirley, 2005, for an overview). Privatization, however, is not a panacea, and privatizing banks 
without addressing weaknesses in the underlying incentive environment and market structure 
will not lead to a deeper and more efficient financial system.    
3.2.6. Financial liberalization 
  Many countries liberalized their financial systems in the 1980s and 1990s with mixed 
results.  Liberalization, including deregulation of interest rates and more relaxed entry policies, 
often led to significant financial development, particularly in countries where there was 
significant repression, but the enthusiasm with which financial liberalization was adopted in 
some countries in the absence of or slow implementation of institutional development also left 
many financial systems vulnerable to systemic crises (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999). 
Poor sequencing of financial liberalization in a poorly prepared contractual and 
supervisory environment contributed to bank insolvencies as banks protected by implicit and 
explicit government guarantees aggressively took advantage of new opportunities to increase 
risk, without the necessary lending skills.  Banking crises in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and 
Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s have been attributed to these factors (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2005).  Although many Sub-Saharan African countries did not suffer instability   49
following liberalization, they did suffer sharp declines in financial intermediation due to the 
absence of an effective contractual and informational framework (See Honohan and Beck, 2007).  
These experiences with financial liberalization underline the importance of sequencing 
liberalization with policy, regulatory, and institutional improvements. 
The relationship between the exchange rate regime and financial liberalization is another 
area of active debate.  One of the reasons this is an important issue is because the choice of 
exchange rate regime may influence the extent to which the impact of external shocks affect 
financial stability.  For instance, flexible exchange rates may have a stabilizing effect on the 
financial system since the exchange rate can absorb some of the real shocks to the economy 
(Mundell, 1961).  Flexible regimes may also curtail the tendency of countries to over-borrow in 
foreign currency and discourage banks from funding dangerous lending booms through external 
credit (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999).  Further, with a fixed exchange rate (and even more 
so with a currency board), lender of last resort operations are severely limited, since domestic 
monetary expansion risks undermining confidence in the currency peg. 
On the other hand, a commitment to a currency peg may reduce the probability of 
banking crises by disciplining policymakers (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998).  The lack of an 
effective lender of last resort may also discourage risk-taking by bankers, decreasing the 
likelihood of a banking crisis.  Finally, developing countries are often plagued by lack of 
credibility and limited access to international markets, and suffer from more pronounced effects 
of exchange rate volatility due to their high liability dollarization.  Thus, the additional 
transparency and credibility associated with fixed exchange rates may insulate a country from 
contagion (Calvo, 1999).      50
Empirically, Arteta and Eichengreen (2002) find that countries with fixed and flexible 
exchange rates are equally susceptible to banking crises.  In contrast, Domac and Martinez Peria 
(2003) find that adopting a fixed exchange rate regime (1) diminishes the likelihood of a banking 
crisis in developing countries and (2) increases the economic cost of a crisis if one occurs.    
Studies on the impact of dollarization on financial fragility similarly reveal mixed 
evidence. Dollarization is a symptom of weak domestic currencies and volatile real exchange 
rates and thus may be associated with fragility.  Arteta (2003) investigates the impact of deposit 
and credit dollarization for a large number of developing and transition countries and finds no 
evidence that dollarization increases fragility.  De Nicolo, Honohan and Ize (2003) perform a 
similar test but measure fragility using average Z-scores (measuring the distance to default for 
the banking system, which is different from the actual occurrence of a systemic crisis) and non-
performing loans across a large number of countries. In contrast to Arteta’s results, they find that 
dollarization is positively related to both measures of bank fragility. More research is needed in 
these areas to guide the on-going policy discussion on the impact of exchange rate policies.  
  With financial liberalization, developing economies are increasingly liberalizing 
restrictions on the entry of foreign financial institutions.  While governments have worried about 
whether allowing foreign banks to take a large ownership share in the banking system could 
damage financial and economic performance, the bulk of the empirical research in this area, 
particularly drawing on the experience of Latin American and Eastern European countries, 
suggests that facilitating entry of reputable foreign institutions to the local market should be 
welcomed.  Arrival or expansion of foreign banks can also be disruptive as the Indian experience 
shows evidence of cream-skimming by foreign banks (Gormley, 2004).  Even there however, in 
the years following entry, foreign banks have started expanding their clientele base.  Overall, a   51
large body of evidence suggests that over time foreign bank entry brings competition, improves 
efficiency, lifts the quality of the financial infrastructure and expands access (Claessens, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Clarke, Cull and Martinez Peria, 2001).
7 
   However, as the African experience illustrates, foreign bank entry cannot guarantee rapid 
financial development in the absence of sound contractual and informational weaknesses 
(Honohan and Beck, 2007).  Such weaknesses can prevent low-income countries from reaping 
full benefits of opening their markets to foreign providers of financial services, and can 
potentially explain the finding that greater foreign bank penetration is associated with lower 
levels of financial development (Detragiache, Tressel, Gupta, 2006).
8  However, addressing 
these weaknesses is likely to allow foreign banks to act as an important catalyst for the sort of 
financial development that promotes growth.  
                                                
  While many support liberalizing financial systems, there are also concerns that this leaves 
them more open to volatility and crises.
9 As discussed above, one way of containing such 
volatility is stronger fundamentals, hence proper sequencing of reforms.
10 Policy discussion has 
also focused on proper design of capital controls, which could prevent or mitigate the effects of 
sudden shifts in foreign capital.  Controls can take the form of restrictions on outflows; 
 
7 While in some countries like Pakistan, foreign banks have been shown to lend less to smaller more opaque 
borrowers because they rely on hard information (Mian, 2003), evidence from Eastern Europe  has shown that 
foreign banks eventually go down market increasing small business lending (De Haas and Naaborg, 2005).  This is 
consistent with recent research that shows as new transaction-based lending techniques have been developed, where 
large foreign institutions have greater advantage, relationship lending, thus small, domestic institutions have become 
less important for SME lending (Berger and Udell, 2006).   
8 Another explanation why cross-country correlations between foreign bank penetration and financial development 
may be negative in low income countries is that in most of those countries foreign bank entry was through 
privatization of failed government banks. 
9 Opening up allows firms to raise resources from abroad, but Levine and Schmukler (2005) show that it reduces the 
trading activity of these firms on domestic stock exchanges, negatively affecting the liquidity of other firms that do 
not internationalize.  However, Ferreira and Matos (2005) show that with increased cross-listing, foreign ownership 
of shares traded on the local exchanges also increase. 
10 Note that studies suggest volatility tends to decrease in the long run, with more integrated markets having lower 
volatility due to better diversification and development of the financial sector (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003).  
However, liberalization does also increase the probability of crisis (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999).   52
restrictions on aggregate inflows; restrictions on short-term flows (a la Chile); or a Tobin tax, 
aimed at imposing a small uniform tax on all foreign exchange transactions, regardless of their 
nature.    
  There is a large literature on the effects of capital controls, but overall, these empirical 
studies suggest that these controls work at best temporarily, with the effects diminishing over 
time, and are not effective in preventing spillovers from very large shocks (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2001). 
  Besides debt and equity flows, workers’ remittances, funds received from migrants 
working abroad, have grown steadily in recent years becoming the second largest source of 
external finance after foreign direct investment.  Furthermore, unlike other capital flows, 
remittances tend to be stable even during periods of economic downturns and crises.  Recent 
research also suggests that remittances do promote financial development (Aggarwal, Demirguc-
Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2006).  Other studies emphasize the importance of financial 
development in allowing countries to make the most out of capital flows.  For example, Hermes 
and Lensink (2003) show that a more developed financial system positively contributes to the 
process of technological diffusion associated with foreign direct investment.  
3.2.7. Facilitating access    
  Access to financial services has increasingly been receiving greater emphasis over the 
recent years (World Bank, 2007).  One reason is that modern development theory sees the lack of 
access to finance as a critical mechanism for generating persistent income inequality, as well as 
slower growth. Another is the observation that small enterprises and poor households face much 
greater obstacles in their ability to access finance all around the world, but particularly in 
developing countries.   53
  What does access to finance mean?  Broad access to financial services implies an absence 
of price and non-price barriers.  It is difficult to define and measure because there are many 
dimensions of access, including availability, cost, and range and quality of services being 
offered.  While there is much data on financial sector development more broadly, until recently 
there was very little data on usage and access to finance, both for households and firms.  Hence, 
there is also very limited analysis on the impact of access to finance on economic development.  
Research using firm level survey data suggests that financing obstacles are the most constraining 
among different barriers to growth (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005).  
Financing obstacles are also found to be highest and most constraining for the growth of smaller 
firms (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004a).  At the household level, lack of access to 
credit is shown to perpetuate poverty because poor households reduce their children’s education 
(Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997).  Similarly, Dehejia and Gatti (2005) find that child 
labor rates are higher in countries with under-developed financial systems, while Beegle et al. 
(2007) show that transitory income shocks lead to greater increases in child labor in countries 
with poorly functioning financial systems.  A better understanding of what the chief obstacles to 
improving access are, and access to which type of financial services has the greater impact on 
reducing poverty and promoting growth, will need to wait for availability of better data and 
analysis in this area. 
  There are many different reasons why the poor do not have access to finance –loans, 
savings accounts, insurance services.  Social and physical distance from the formal financial 
system may matter.  The poor may not have anybody in their social network who knows the 
various services that are available to them.  Lack of education may make it difficult for them to 
overcome problems with filling out loan applications, and the small number of transactions they   54
are likely to undertake may make the loan officers think it is not worthwhile to help them.  As 
financial institutions are likely to be in richer neighborhoods, physical distance may also matter, 
banks simply may not be near the poor (Beck and De la Torre, 2006).  Specifically for access to 
credit services, there are two important problems.  First, the poor have no collateral, and cannot 
borrow against their future income because they tend not to have steady jobs or income streams 
to keep track of.   Second, dealing with small transactions is costly for the financial institutions. 
Ceilings on the rates financial institutions can charge backfire and limit access to the poor even 
more. 
 Microfinance  –specialized  institutions that serve the poor - tries to overcome these 
problems in innovative ways.  Loan officers come from similar social status as the borrowers and 
go to the poor instead of waiting for the poor to come to them.  Microcredit also involves 
education as much as it provides credit.  Group lending schemes not only improve repayment 
incentives and monitoring through peer pressure, but they are also a way of building support 
networks and educating borrowers.   
  Has microfinance fulfilled its promise?  Microfinance allows poor people to have more 
direct access, but development of microfinance around the world has been very non-uniform, 
with significant penetration rates only in a few countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia and 
Thailand (Honohan, 2004).  Group lending is very costly since labor cost per dollar of 
transactions needs to be high by design.  The most controversial aspect of microfinance, 
however, has been the extent of subsidy required to provide this access.  Overall, the 
microfinance sector remains heavily grant and subsidy dependent.  Skeptics question whether 
microfinance is the best way to provide those subsidies and point out that development of   55
mainstream finance is a more promising way to reach the poor and alleviate poverty in 
significant ways (World Bank,  2007; Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch, 2008). 
  There are also good political economy reasons why we should not focus on the poor and 
ask how we can make microfinance more viable, but instead ask how financial services can be 
made available for all (Rajan, 2006).
11  The poor lack the political clout to demand better 
services, and subsidies may spoil the credit culture.  By defining the issue more broadly to 
include the middle class who often also lack access, would make it more likely that promotion of 
financial assess will be made a priority.   
  What can governments do to promote access? Many of the policies recommended above 
to enhance the overall development of the financial sector will also help increase access.  
However, the overlap is not perfect, and explicit prioritization of access is therefore important.  
For example, certain regulations aimed at financial stability or combating terrorism can restrict 
access of small firms and poor households.  Or focusing on development of offshore financial 
centers to export wholesale financial services may lead to the neglect of onshore financial 
infrastructures necessary for access of small firms and individuals.  Also, it is important to set 
realistic goals; not all potential borrowers are creditworthy, and many banking crises were 
precipitated by overly relaxed credit policies. 
  First and foremost, governments can further access by making and encouraging 
infrastructure improvements.  However, prioritizing different reform efforts is important and 
recent research also suggests that in low-income countries improving information infrastructures 
seems to yield more immediate access benefits than legal reforms (Djankov et al., 2007).  But 
legal reforms are also important, and among those there is evidence that while protection of   56
property rights against the state is more important for financial development generally, other 
aspects of contract enforcement (such as institutions relating to collateral) may be more 
important for access (Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2006). 
  Institutional reform is a long term process and specific policy actions can help boost 
access sooner.  There are a wide range of such measures, ranging from specific legislation to 
underpin nonblank intermediation including leasing and factoring; technologies based on the 
internet and mobile phones; development of credit registries; protection against money 
laundering and terrorist finance without jeopardizing household access and others.   
  For example, at the household level, giving each individual a national identification 
number and creating credit registries where lenders share information about their clients’ 
repayment records would help since all borrowers could then borrow using their future access to 
credit as collateral (Rajan, 2006). Reducing costs of registering and repossessing collateral is 
also crucial.  In Brazil for example, inability to repossess property has contributed to the cost of 
the housing finance program, keeping the mortgage rates too high to be affordable for the poor. 
Governments can also be instrumental in facilitating innovative technologies to improve access.  
For example in Mexico, a program developed by Nafin, a government development bank, allows 
many small suppliers to use their receivables from large credit-worthy buyers to receive working 
capital financing (Klapper, 2006).  This type of trade finance is called reverse factoring and 
effectively allows small firms to borrow based on the creditworthiness of their buyers, allowing 
them to borrow more at cheaper rates.
12  
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Rajan (2006) argues “…let’s not kill the microfinance movement with kindness.  If we want it to become more 
than a fad…it has to follow the clear and unsentimental path of adding value and making money.  On that path lies 
the possibility of a true and large-scale escape from poverty.”  
12 Also see Berger and Udell (2006) for a discussion of different innovative technologies that can expand access of 
small firms even in the absence of a strong institutional environment.  De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2005) 
include other such public-private partnership examples of expanding access.   57
  Government regulation can also help.  Removal of interest ceilings, or usury laws, would 
allow institutions to charge the rates that they need to be profitable and improve access.  These 
regulations end up hurting the very poor they are trying to protect as the supply of these services 
completely dry up.  Anti-predatory lending and truth in lending requirements are also very 
important since households may also be forced into over-borrowing by unscrupulous lenders.  
Anti-discrimination policies may also help against cases of active or passive discrimination 
against the poor or different ethnic groups.     
  It is also important to ensure that other complex regulations – such as Basel II regulations 
that are intended to help banks minimize costly bank failures – do not inadvertently penalize 
small borrowers and hurt access by failing to make full allowance for the potential for a portfolio 
of small and medium enterprise loans to achieve risk pooling.  Financial regulations can also 
prevent the emergence of institutions better suited to the needs of lower income households or 
smaller firms.  Rigid chartering rules, high capital adequacy requirements, very strict accounting 
requirements may reduce the ability of institutions to serve the poorer segments of the society.  
As many households are interested in savings services but not in credit services, considering and 
regulating savings mobilization separately from credit services may be helpful (Claessens, 2005). 
For example in South Africa, extension of bank regulation and supervision to microfinance 
institutions reduced their capacity to offer their services profitably (Glaessner et al. 2004).   
  Governments can also opt to stimulate access more directly.  The US Treasury’s 
Electronic Transfer Accounts (ETAs) to increase use of bank accounts, US Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) to improve access to credit services, legal measures adopted by the 
UK, France, Sweden, and Ireland among others, are such examples.  However, there is little 
consensus on the success of those schemes (Peachey and Roe, 2006; Claessens, 2005) and   58
whether they can be replicated in developing countries.  The experiences with credit extensions, 
especially to improve the maturity structure of debt and reach the SMEs, are extensive in both 
developed and developing countries.  However, both the rationale for and effectiveness of those 
interventions are much more doubtful (see Caprio and Demirguc-Kunt, 1998; Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006).  As already discussed above, interventions through ownership of 
government institutions have also not been successful, overall. 
  Last but perhaps most importantly, governments can improve access by increasing 
competition in the financial sector.  As financial institutions find their traditional business 
coming under competition, they seek out new lines of profitable opportunities, including lending 
to the SMEs and the poor.  Given the right incentives, private sector can develop and make use 
of new technologies – like credit scoring – to reach the underserved segments.  As already 
discussed above, foreign banks’ role in improving the competition environment and improving 
access is important.  There is accumulating evidence that over time, foreign banks can enhance 
access.  Indeed, multinational banks have been leading the way in expanding access all around 
the world.
13     
Finally, should all countries follow these recommendations?  While the general messages 
will not be dissimilar, the directions in which financial sector needs improvement in different 
countries will be based on their initial conditions (World Bank, 2001 and 2007).  Furthermore, 
good policy making draws inputs from many sources, and research is only one such input.  
Implementation of policy requires complementing the results of research analysis with 
practitioner experience, hence tempering and tailoring this advice to individual country 
circumstances.  In general, these reforms are likely to be most challenging for low-income 
                                                 
13 Studies have found that while foreign banks with small local presence do not appear to lend much to small 
businesses, large foreign banks in many cases surpass large domestic banks.  See for example, Sanchez et al. 2006.   59
countries, where the legacy of financial repression and state ownership has generally hampered 
the development of a vigorous private financial system, where the underlying legal and 
information infrastructure is weak, and achieving minimum efficient scale will be difficult.  
   
4. Conclusion 
  While the different methodologies used to study the finance-growth connection have 
distinct strengths and weaknesses, they produce remarkably consistent results.  The main, 
tentative conclusions that we garner from recent empirical work are as follows:  
(1) Countries with a better-developed financial system tend to grow faster.  Specifically, 
both financial intermediaries and markets matter for growth.  The size of the banking 
system and the liquidity of stock markets are each positively linked with economic 
growth. 
(2) Simultaneity bias does not seem to be the cause of this result.   
(3) Better-functioning financial systems ease the external financing constraints that 
impede firm and industrial expansion.  Thus, one channel through which financial 
development matters for growth is by easing the ability of constrained industries and 
firms to access external capital and expand.   
We state these conclusions simply, but stress that we hold them with a significant degree 
of skepticism.  These findings may certainly be refuted, qualified, and clarified by future work 
and we have listed various avenues for future research in the text.  Nevertheless, our assessment 
of a large – albeit not unanimous – body of evidence supports these three conclusions. 
  To the extent that financial systems exert a first-order influence on economic growth, this 
motivates research into the determinants of well functioning financial systems.  A new and   60
exciting literature researches this question.  Some focuses on the direct laws and regulations 
shaping the operation of financial systems, while complementary work examines the broader 
political, historical, and institutional determinants of financial development.   
  Subject to even greater qualifications, some lessons can also be drawn about policy 
foundations of financial development.  
(1) Well-functioning financial systems need stable macroeconomic policies and strong legal 
and information systems.  Making infrastructure improvements a priority is a must.   
(2) Promoting a contestable financial sector – as characterized by lower entry barriers, fewer 
regulatory restrictions on bank activities, greater banking freedoms -is essential for 
improving depth, efficiency and access.  This means reducing government ownership 
through careful privatization, and domestic and international liberalization including 
foreign entry.  Opening up is also accompanied by risks however, particularly a higher 
risk of financial crisis, and therefore needs to be synchronized with improvements in 
institutional improvements. 
(3) Governments have an important role to play as regulators.  But empirical evidence 
suggests the best approach to regulation is one which empowers the markets, rather than 
creating all powerful regulators who may be subject to corruption and political and 
industry capture.  Empowering the market entails enforcing accurate and timely 
information disclosure and providing the right incentives for market participants to make 
sure they remain vigilant monitors – for example, through avoiding generous and mis-
priced deposit insurance, or forbearance policies that distort risk-taking incentives.   
Research also questions the wisdom of transplanting First World practice to developing 
countries.  Often regulations considered appropriate in developed economies prove   61
ineffective or counterproductive in weaker institutional settings:  Explicit deposit 
insurance may destabilize the very financial system it is meant to protect, and powerful 
supervisors may be more prone to corruption and extracting rents. Hence, the importance 
of institutional factors that need strengthening to support these policies. 
(4) Governments also have an important role to play in facilitating broad access to financial 
services, i.e., in expanding the availability of the range of financial services to a broader 
set of households, firms and sectors in the economy.  Government policies should focus 
on building good institutions and encouraging competition – including foreign entry- and 
good prudential regulation to provide the private sector with appropriate incentive 
structures and broaden access.  Governments can facilitate the development of an 
enabling financial infrastructure and encourage adoption of new technologies, but 
attempts at direct intervention, for example through subsidies or ownership of financial 
institutions, are more likely than not to be counter-productive.  
  Finally, while the general messages will be similar, the priorities and the extent to which 
the financial sector needs improvement in each country will depend on initial conditions, with 
the reforms being the most challenging for low-income countries.  Good policymaking 
complements research with practitioner experience and tailors advice to individual country 
circumstances.   62
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Table 1: Growth and Financial Intermediary Development, 1960-89    
          
Dependent Variable  Depth Bank  Privy    
          
Real per Capita GDP Growth  2.4**  3.2**  3.2**    
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.002)   
R
2 0.50  0.50  0.52    
          
Real per Capita Capital Growth  2.2**  2.2**  2.5**    
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)   
R
2 0.65  0.62  0.64    
          
Productivity Growth  1.8**  2.6**  2.5**    
  (0.026) (0.010) (0.006)   
R
2 0.42  0.43  0.44    
              
Source: King and Levine (1993b), Table VII         
* significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level         
(p-values in parentheses)           
Observations: 77           
          
Variable definitions:         
DEPTH = Liquid Liabilities/GDP           
BANK = Deposit bank domestic credit/[deposit bank domestic credit + central bank domestic credit 
PRIVY = Gross claims on the private sector / GDP         
Productivity Growth = Real per capita GDP growth - (0.3)*(Real per capita Capital growth)   
          
Other explanatory variables included in each of the nine regression results reported above: 
logarithm of initial income, logarithm of initial secondary school enrollment, ratio of government consumption 
expenditures to GDP, inflation rate, and ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. 
          
Notes: King and Levine (1993b) define 2 percent growth as 0.02.  For comparability with subsequent tables, 
we have redefined 2 percent growth as 2.00 and adjusted the coefficients by a factor of 100.   74
 
Table 2: Growth and Initial Financial Depth, 1960-89   
    
Dependent Variable  Depth in 1960   
    
Real per Capita GDP Growth, 1960-89  2.8**   
  (0.001)   
R
2  0.61   
    
Real per Capita Capital Growth, 1960-89  1.9**   
  (0.001)   
R
2  0.63   
    
Productivity Growth, 1960-89  2.2**   
  (0.001)   
R
2  0.58   
       
Sources: King and Levine (1993b), Table VIII; and Levine (1997), Table 3   
* significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level     
(p-values in parentheses).  Observations: 57     
Variable definitions:    
DEPTH = Liquid Liabilities/GDP     
Productivity Growth = Real per capita GDP growth - (0.3)*(Real per capita Capital growth) 
Other explanatory variables included in each of the regression results reported above: 
logarithm of initial income, logarithm of initial secondary school enrollment, ratio of government consumption expenditures 
to GDP, inflation rate, and ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. 
Notes: King and Levine (1993b) and Levine (1997) define 2 percent growth as 0.02.  For comparability with subsequent 
tables, we have redefined 2 percent growth as 2.00 and adjusted the coefficients by a factor of 100. 
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Table 3: Stock Market and Bank Development Predict Growth, 1976-1993   
          
Dependent Variable (1976-93)  Independent Variables (1976)       
   Bank Credit  Turnover     R
2   
          
Real per Capita GDP Growth   1.31**  2.69**    0.50  
  (0.022) (0.005)      
          
Real per Capita Capital Growth  1.48**  2.22**    0.51  
  (0.025) (0.024)      
          
Productivity Growth  1.11**  2.01**    0.40  
  (0.020) (0.029)      
                
Source: Levine and Zervos (1998), Table 3.        
* significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level. (p-values in parentheses)   
Observations: 42 for the real per capita GDP growth regression and 41 for the others.   
Variable definitions:          
Bank Credit = Bank credit to the private sector / GDP in 1976 or the closest date with data. 
Turnover = Value of the trades of domestic shares on domestic exchanges as a share of market 
capitalization of domestic shares in 1976 or the closest date with data. 
Productivity Growth = Real per capita GDP growth - (0.3)*(Real per capita Capital growth)   
Other explanatory variables included in each of regression results reported above:   
logarithm of initial income, logarithm of initial secondary school enrollment, ratio of government 
consumption expenditures to GDP, inflation rate, black market exchange rate premium, and frequency 
of revolutions and coups. 
Notes: Levine and Zervos define 2 percent growth as 0.02.  For comparability with subsequent tables, 
we have redefined 2 percent growth as 2.00 and adjusted the coefficients by a factor of 100. 
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Table 4: Growth, Productivity Growth, and Capital Accumulation, Panel GMM and OLS, 1960-1995    
                  
1. Dependent Variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth                 







(p-value)    
                  
IV-Cross-Country   2.22**  63  63  0.577         
   (0.003)               
GMM-Panel   2.40**  77  365    0.183  0.516     
      (0.001)                      
2. Dependent Variable: Productivity Growth              







(p-value)    
                  
IV-Cross-Country   1.50**  63  63  2.036         
   (0.004)               
GMM-Panel   1.33**  77  365    0.205  0.772     
      (0.001)                      
3. Dependent Variable: Capital per Capita Growth            







(p-value)    
                  
IV-Cross-Country   2.83**  63  63  6.750         
   (0.006)               
GMM-Panel   3.44**  77  365    0.166  0.014     
      (0.001)                      
Source: Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000)               
1 The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals from the respective regression       
  Critical values for OIR-Test  (2 d.f.): 10%= 4.61; 5%= 5.99               
2 The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals from the respective regression       
3 The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation        
* significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level  (p-values in parentheses)           
IV-Cross-Country: Cross-country instrumental variables with legal origin as instruments, estimated using GMM         
GMM-Panel: Dynamic panel (5-year averages) generalized method of moments using system estimator         
Other explanatory variables:  logarithm of initial income per capita, average years of schooling         
PRIVATE CREDIT: Logarithm (credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP.)      
   77
 
Table 5: Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel GMM and OLS, 1975-1998   
              
Dependent Variable: Real per Capita GDP Growth               
Estimation Procedure    
Bank 







2  (p-value) 
              
OLS-Cross-Country    1.47** 0.79**  40      
   (0.001) (0.025)        
              
GMM-Panel    1.76** 0.96**  40 146  0.488  0.60 
   (0.001) (0.001)        
                        
Source: Beck and Levine (2004), Tables 2 and 3        
* significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level.  (p-values in parentheses)     
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares with heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.       
GMM: Dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments using system estimator.       
     1 The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.     
     2 The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference regression exhibit        
        no second-order serial correlation.           
Bank Credit = logarithm (credit by deposit money banks to the private sector as a share of GDP.)   
Turnover = logarithm (Value of the trades of domestic shares on domestic exchanges as a share of market capitalization of 
domestic shares) 
Other explanatory variables included in each of the regression results reported above:   
logarithm of initial income and  logarithm of initial secondary school enrollment.       
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Table 6: Industry Growth and Financial Development     
              
Dependent Variable:    Growth of value added of industry k in country i, 1980-1990 
        
Share i,k of industry k in country i in 1980    Externalk * Total 
Capitalizationi   
Externalk * Accounting 
Standardsi  R
2 Observations 
        
-0.912 0.069    0.29 1217 
(0.246) (0.023)      
        
-0.643    0.155 0.35  1067 
(0.204)    (0.034)    
              
Notes:        
Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998), Table 4.      
 
The table above 
reports the results 
from the regression:           
        
Two regressions are reported corresponding to two values of FDi, Total Capitalization and Account Standards respectively. 
(Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.)    
Externalk is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for U.S. firms in industry k between 1980-90. 
Total Capitalization is stock market capitalization plus domestic credit.    
Accounting Standards is an index of the quality of corporate financial reports.   
k i i k k i
jl
l l j j k i FD External Share Industry Country Growth , 1 , , ) * ( ε δ γ β α + + + + =∑∑  79
Table 7: Excess Growth of Firms and External Financing          
                    
Dependent Variable: Proportion of firms that grow faster than their predicted growth rate
1    
                    
Market Capitalization/GDP  Turnover  Bank Assets/GDP Adj. R
2 Countries        
-0.106 0.311***  0.162***  0.48  26     
(0.058) (0.072)  (0.050)          
                    
              
Notes:             
Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Table V          
(White's heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses)        
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.          
              
1. The proportion of firms whose growth rates exceed the estimate of the maximum growth rate that can be financed by 
relying only on internal and short-term financing.    
Market Capitalization/GDP: The value of domestic equities listed on domestic exchanges as a share of GDP. 
Turnover: The total value of trades of domestic shares on domestic exchanges as a share of market capitalization. 
Other regressors: rate of inflation, the law and order tradition of the economy, i.e., the extent to which citizens utilize existing legal system
mediate disputes and enforce contracts, growth rate of real GDP per capita, real GDP per capita, government subsidies to private indust
and public enterprises as a share of GDP, and net fixes assets divided by total assets. 
Time period: The dependent variable is averaged over the 1986-1991 period.  All regressors are averaged over the 1980-1985 period, d
permitting. 
 